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Abstract
This paper presents a study of the threat of malicious inter-
ference to GNSS and examines the special case where the
jamming device is incrementally more sophisticated than
a typical always-on interference source. The concept of a
systematic jamming attack is considered, where the inter-
ference signal is intentionally synchronized with the GNSS
signals, with the intention of causing maximum disrup-
tion with the minimum power expenditure. Various attack
methodologies are examined for the case of a civilian L1
receiver. It is shown that, depending on the attack strat-
egy, the target signal and the target receiver, data-recovery,
navigation and timing can be denied to a user with some
tens of decibels less average power than a traditional jam-
ming attack. It is further shown that some attacks may be
capable to effectively deny some receiver functionality in
a subtle manner such that presence of the malicious inter-
ference goes undetected. Key signal and receiver features
that expose a vulnerability are identified and some means
of improving receiver robustness are provided.
INTRODUCTION
The vulnerability of GNSS to various forms of malicious
interference have been widely discussed in recent years, and
have considered a wide range of both real and potential
attacks. Some of these have included extensive studies of
commercially available jamming devices [7, 9] while others
have considered the more comprehensive case of spoofing,
where the interference takes the form of genuine GNSS
signals [4, 12, 13].
Studies of simple jamming attacks have demonstrated
that it is relatively easy, given sufficient broadcast power,
to deny the use of GNSS to many commercial receivers
[6, 10, 15]. However, it has also been shown that given
the easily identifiable or periodic nature of simple jam-
ming signals, a receiver can often mitigate the threat, for
example, via the use of adaptive filtering or pulse blank-
ing [2, 8]. Furthermore, it has been demonstrated that
the jamming signal itself can be readily exploited to iden-
tify [11] and locate [3] the jamming source. Recent work
on GNSS spoofing have shown that current receivers are
vulnerable to a well calibrated spoofing attack [4], and it
is clear that many receivers can be manipulated without
arousing any suspicion. However, such attacks are highly
complicated and require knowledge of the GNSS signals,
and the attack scenario, including precise timing and po-
sitioning [5].
It is proposed here that some middle ground must exist.
A typical jammer is blind to the GNSS signals it over-
whelms, and simply relies on power and spectral occupa-
tion to deny the GNSS signals to a nearby user. In contrast,
a spoofing device must faithfully replicate the characteris-
tics of genuine GNSS signals. An attack will be highly
sensitive to alignment of time, phase and power, with the
GNSS signals it intends to replace and the effectiveness
of the attack is dependent on the fidelity of the signals it
broadcasts. However, it is likely that some device might be
created which is only slightly more complex than a simple
in-car jammer, but which can exploit some information of
the GNSS signals it intends to overwhelm in such a way
as to increase the efficiency or effectiveness of a jamming-
based denial of service attack.
Specifically, this work introduces the concept of system-
atic jamming: where a simple jammer might be equipped
with some information of the GNSS signals, and can use
this to perform a more sophisticated jamming. For exam-
ple, it is suggested that the jammer may be equipped with
a simple low-cost commercial GNSS receiver [14], such that
it would then have access to accurate position and time,
and also to satellite ephemerides. With some very basic
integration of this information, it might be possible to trig-
ger short and sparse bursts of interference at specific times,
such as to deny GNSS to a nearby receiver, and to do so
with a very low average power. In this manner, a receiver
might be unable to: reliably detect that a jamming attack
was ongoing; to effectively mitigate the jamming attack;
or to identify or localize the jamming source. In the work
that follows, we consider what form such a jammer might
take, what the implications for the nearby target receiver
might be, and how a target receiver might be equipped to
thwart such an attack.
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Figure 1: A block diagram of a hypothetical systematic
jammer.
PROBLEM DEFINITION
This work considers the threat that might be posed if a
malicious adversary were to add a small amount of added
complexity to the typical GNSS jammer, with the inten-
tion of providing bursts of interference at specific epochs.
A modification to the typical GNSS jammer is envis-
aged, which includes an on/off keying driven by a micro-
controller, as depicted in Fig. 1. The algorithm control-
ling the keying employs position and timing information
sourced from a simple, low-cost GNSS consumer-grade re-
ceiver (naturally, it may also implement pulse blanking to
avoid self-interference). Based on low-rate position and
timing messages, and satellite ephemeris information, a ba-
sic orbit propagation can provide accurate estimates of the
transmit-time observed on GNSS signals seen in the vicin-
ity of the jammer.
It is proposed that this information might be exploited
by an adversary to trigger short pulses of interference which
are tightly aligned with certain portions of the navigation
message of each satellite. Previous work has demonstrated
that, a low duty-cycle pulsed interference, that is appropri-
ately synchronized with the navigation message, can cause
disruption to the receiver data recovery process, equivalent
to that of an always-on interference [1]. This process re-
quires that the pulse pattern be designed to specifically tar-
get weaknesses in the navigation message coding scheme,
and it has been shown that for the case of convolutional
encoding and block interleaving that a malicious adver-
sary might inflict a denial-of-service (DOS) upon a naïve
receiver, using an average interference power 10 to 20 dB
lower than the continuous interference case.
Naturally, this offers some distinct advantages to the ad-
versary: a given broadcast power might impose a DOS over
a wider geographical area; by broadcasting short sporadic
bursts of interference, it may be more difficult for an au-
thority to detect or locate the jamming source; it may also
be possible that the interference pattern can be made suffi-
ciently sparse that the target receiver, although experienc-
ing a DOS, might not reliably assert that it is experiencing
interference.
This work will examine this threat from two perspec-
tives, that of the malicious adversary, and that of the tar-
get receiver. The current Galileo and GPS signals, E1B
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and L1C/A, respectively, will be studied, seeking to iden-
tify how best the adversary might target these signals, and
will then analyse to what extent a DOS might be con-
ducted. This study will seek to quantify improvements in
jamming effectiveness relative to the continuous interfer-
ence case. The study will then examine the problem from
the perspective of the target receiver, aiming to identify
characteristics of a systematic jamming attack that might
facilitate either the detection of an ongoing attack, or the
mitigation of an ongoing attack.
SYSTEMATIC INTERFERENCE AND DENIAL
OF SERVICE ATTACKS
This section provides a study of one specific vulnerabil-
ities of a variety of GNSS signals to a systematic inter-
ference. Here, the methodology chosen for the generation
of harmful pulse-patterns is based on denying navigation
capability of the receiver, rather than denying the signal
itself. To produce a position, velocity and time (PVT) so-
lution, a receiver generally needs to extract the ephemeris
and the time-of-week (TOW) from each satellite used in
the computation of the navigation solution. In many occa-
sions a recently extracted ephemeris may be available and,
so, need not be extracted. In other cases, when a coarse
position and satellite ephemerides are available, a receiver
may need to extract the TOW from one satellite, and can
infer the TOW on others. Thus, it is noted that, at the
very minimum, a receiver must extract a TOW record at
least once, from at least one satellite navigation message,
in order to provide a PVT. This section examines the de-
sign of interference pulse patterns which might disrupt this
process.
Sensitive navigation data
A TOW message is broadcast by all GNSS signals at
regular intervals, and generally occupies a very small
portion of the overall navigation message. In the case
of GPS L1 C/A and GLONASS L1 OF the TOW is
broadcast in an unencoded form once per subframe,
whereas for Galileo E1B, it is encoded, and broadcast
once per pair of pages. As such, the denial of TOW for
the GPS and GLONASS signals requires either the denial
of the subframe synchronization, or denial of the raw data
itself. In the case of Galileo, the TOW might be denied by
either denying page synchronization, or by inducing errors
in the symbol decoding process. The basic details of the
navigation messages, as shown in Fig. 2, are as follows.
GPS: The L1 C/A preamble is an 8 bit sequence (160 ms)
transmitted every 6 seconds. The GPS parity is composed
of 6 bit (120 ms) transmitted every 600 ms (navigation
data word). Checking the consistency of two subsequent
preambles, as well as the 10 parity checks in between,
is a commonly accepted mean of synchronizing to the 6
seconds boundary.
Galileo: The E1B signal transmits a plain 10 symbol
synchronization sequence (40 ms) every second. It is
interesting to see that GPS and Galileo synchronization
sequences hardly overlap in time. The Galileo message
CRC is FEC encoded and then spread by an interleaver.
The E1B receiver de-interleaves the data and runs a
Viterbi decoder to retrieve the 120 bit/sec of I/NAV.
The identification of a word results in resolving a 2
seconds time ambiguity. In addition Galileo E1C is a pilot
channel which allows continuous alignment to the 100
ms boundary. Galileo time and GPS time are essentially
aligned for what concerns this analysis.
GLONASS: The L1 OF signal transmits a trimmed
pseudo-random sequence of 300 ms duration as time
mark at the end of each 2-seconds page. GLONASS time
implements leap second and is aligned to UTC for what
concerns this analysis.
Design of Interference Pulse Patterns
The object of this section is to identify an interference sig-
nal that will deny the extraction of the TOW from the
above signals using the least amount of energy possible
such that the target receiver either remain unaware of the
jamming attack; might be unable to effectively mitigate
the jamming signal. To simplify the problem somewhat,
the jamming signal is restricted to be an on-off-keying of a
chirp interference signal, having on pulses of fixed duration
equal to some integer milliseconds.
Two particular examples are explored here: GPS L1 C/A
which is subjected to pulsed interference across the broad-
cast TOW, and the case of Galileo E1B, which is subject
to pulsed interference across a series of symbols spaced
according to the symbol interleaver, and are depicted in
Fig. 3. The GPS pulse pattern has been aligned with the
17-bit TOW and consists of 6 20 ms pulses, each separated
by a 20 ms. The Galileo pulse pattern consists of 15 4 ms
pulses, spaced according to the Galileo 8× 30 block inter-
leaver, such that all 12 pulses appear consecutively once
the received symbol stream has been deinterleaved.
This particular choice of pulse patterns is somewhat ar-
bitrary, and has been selected based on some simple exper-
iments. A more thorough design might carefully weigh the
choice of number of pulses, pulse duration, and instanta-
neous interference power, to find a pattern which provides
the highest probability of inducing bit errors, with the min-
imum probability of being detected. This, of course, will
depend greatly on the particular monitoring techniques of
the receiver - most notably the C/N0 estimator, and track-
ing look design.
To align these pulse patterns with the received GNSS
signals, they are broadcast with a fixed delay relative to
3
Time (s)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Se
ns
iti
ve
 N
av
ig
at
io
n 
D
at
a
GLO
GAL
GPS
Preamble
Time mark
CRC/Parity
Figure 2: Position in time of various portions of sensitive data contained in each of the GPS, Galileo and GLONASS
navigation messages.
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Figure 3: Example pulse patterns for the systematic jam-
ming of the GPS L1 C/A and Galileo E1B navigation mes-
sages.
the edge of a GPS 6 second boundary. All GNSS satellites
broadcast their messages in synchronous, and all have are
observed at a range between 18,000 and 24,000 km, de-
pending azimuth and elevation, this fixed delay was set to
67 ms, or approximately 20,000 km. Note that the max-
imum variation between nearest and furthest satellite re-
sults in a misalignment of less than 20 ms, and so the pulse
pattern applied to the GPS L1 C/A message will still over-
lap completely with the 17 bit TOW message. Similarly,
owing to the nature of the block interleaver used for Galileo
E1B, when the pulse pattern is shifted relative to the en-
coded symbols, provided they still overlap with a single
page, the will deinterleave to a continuous stream.
ANATOMY OF A SYSTEMATIC JAMMER
Until very recently, the only widely available transceiver
option existing for radio amateurs and naviga-
tion/telecommunication engineers was the Ettus product
line: the USRPs. More recently the technological ad-
vances in the integration of RF components into single
multi-modal chips (mostly driven by the 3G/4G and DTV
market) have enabled the design of relatively simple,
highly versatile low cost SDR peripherals. A compre-
hensive review of such hardware is not appropriate here.
However worth mentioning are Michael Ossman’s HackRF
One and the Nuand’s bladeRF as both were available in
the laboratory and were used to demonstrate the concepts
illustrated above. The most relevant specifications for
these two devices are in Tab. 1
Designing and building a sophisticated jammer would be
a controversial research activity and would pass the mes-
sage that synchronised jamming needs specialist expertise
and skilled personnel, when instead it is relatively sim-
ple. Using a general purpose transceiver reading samples
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HackRF One bladeRF
Freq span 30 MHz - 6 GHz 300 MHz - 4.2 GHz
Bandwidth 20 MHz 28 MHz
Bits 8 I&Q ADC/DAC 12 I&Q ADC/DAC
Interface USB 2.0 HS USB 3.0
Radio RFFC5072+MAX2837 Lime Semi LMS6602D
Baseband CPLD + MCU FPGA + CPU
Clock In, out, 10ppm In, out, 0.5ppm VCTCXO
Trigger No (but added) Yes (recently)
Table 1: Specification of the transceivers used in the tests
from disk, a 6 second long IF file can be created contain-
ing bursts of wideband noise at specific positions in time.
Such IF file can be played back in a loop for as long as the
reference clock of the transceiver maintains good synchro-
nisation with the navigation data bits to be jammed. A
real-time orbit propagator is not necessary if synchronisa-
tion errors of about 10 ms can be tolerated, as an average
travel time of e.g. 67 ms can be assumed for all satellites.
A low quality frequency source will maintain ms-level syn-
chronisation in several minutes of operation, but a com-
mon TCXO will not build significant skew before a few
hours. The experimented approach however present the
additional practical requirement to avoid streaming packet
losses. Each packet can contain a few ms of data, depend-
ing on the chosen bandwidth and quantisation thus a few
packet losses will significantly disrupt the synchronisation
with the live SIS. Both the hackRF and the bladeRF were
designed mainly for telecommunications where the unin-
terrupted streaming is not as important as it is in radio-
navigation.
Synchronisation of the Jammer with GNSS-Time
In order to allow proper synchronisation of a common PC
peripheral it is necessary to stay away from high abstrac-
tion layers and act as close as possible to the hardware. In
fact, the USB or Ethernet busses have too unpredictable
latency in non-real-time Operating Systems. The ms-level
time keeping of the PC clock is already a non-negligible
task without bespoke software and low-latency intercon-
nection to a dedicated time-server (e.g. timing equipment
exposing a NTP server). Then, the absence of high-priority
interrupts in the OS can invalidate the approach alto-
gether. On the other hand the clock accuracy obtainable
using directly the CMOS signal, even from a mass-market
receiver, is about 50 ns.
A trigger for the bladeRF was added to the stock
firmware released on June 2016. At the time of writing the
hackRF did not support triggering but, as it is an open
hardware and software design, such feature was promptly
implemented. One of the GPIOs of the CPLD was used
to hold the FIFO data from being dispatched to the DAC
until a rising edge of the trigger signal would be registered,
Figure 4: Intuitive diagram of the gate feature imple-
mented in the CPLD (pulse-to-level translator)
as shown in Fig. 4.
A trigger-forward line was also inserted in order to sim-
plify chaining multiple transmitters. The MCU firmware
and user-level application were accordingly modified to
cope with the trigger feature and to avoid buffer under-
runs on the disk when streaming. As the CPLD is clocked
at twice the DAC speed the resolution of trigger is limited
by the clock period of the transmitted signal, so assuming
10 MHz bandwidth to about ±25 ns which is compara-
ble with the GPS module accuracy and well below what is
needed for synchronized navigation data jamming.
Testing for synchronizing of two transmitters was per-
formed by generating two wideband CDMA sequences and
playing them through a combiner into a single channel re-
ceiver. The orthogonality of the sequences allows reception
of both without interference by means of a matched filter
as well as measurement accuracy limited by the bandwidth
of the recording device. In this case, a GNSS-like PRN
was generated and used to test the triggering of a pair of
hackRF devices.
Synchronization with the true time was further tested by
generating a simulated satellite signal using actual broad-
cast navigation data and orbit of one particular satellite
signal visible at the time, but modulating it with a different
PRN, one that was not visible at the time. The playback
was triggered using a GPS-aligned PPS, and this simulated
signal was combined with the a live feed from a roof-top an-
tenna, and broadcast into a standard GNSS receiver. The
receiver produced a set of pseudoranges, one for each vis-
ible satellite, along with a pseudorange for the simulated
signal. The principle of the test is that the simulated signal
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Figure 5: Prototype systematic jammer constructed using
a hackRF One and a µBlox timing receiver for PPS gener-
ation.
would appear as with a new SVID, but exhibit the same
pseudorange as the satellite from which its navigation data
and orbit were copied. Indeed, this simulated range was
aligned well with the corresponding genuine signal, indicat-
ing that the trigger did launch the transmission at a PPS
edge. However, it was observed that the range diverged
rapidly due to the poor clock quality of the transmitter.
This indicated that it would be necessary to periodically
re-synchronize the transmission with GPS time.
LIVE TESTING WITH COTS RECEIVER
This section briefly describes results of a simple system-
atic interference test conducted on a COTS GNSS receiver.
The prototype systematic jammer was constructed using
a single hackRF One, which derived synchronisation with
GPS time via a uBlox timing receiver, which delivered a ris-
ing edge on a trigger once every 30 seconds, as depicted in
Fig. 5. Note that although this device delivered a very pre-
cise timing reference, the systematic jamming attack does
not necessarily require such accuracy, indeed the GNSS
propagation delay is approximated with an error of up to
10 ms. Therefore, a 1 to 10 ms accurate reference derived
from a wired or wireless network, being WiFi or a 3G mo-
bile network, would suffice.
The test consisted of a conductive combination of a life
GNSS feed from a roof mounted antenna with a systematic
interference signal. The unit under test was a uBlox M8N
receiver and was configured to deliver raw observations to
a host PC for post processing. The bench-top configu-
ration is shown if Fig. 6, where the interference signal is
combined directly with the live GNSS feed, and is subse-
quently split between the UUT and a spectrum analyser.
A series of tests were conducted to identify the minimum
instantaneous power that could be applied which would
reliably deny the extraction of the TOW from the target
Figure 6: Configuration of the live testing of a uBlox M8N
receiver, subject to systematic interference. The experi-
ment consisted of the conductive combining of interference
with a live signal feed from a roof mounted antenna.
signal. In the conductive test, the live GNSS signals ar-
rive to the combiner having been amplified by both the
antenna, and an in-line amplifier, and so the interference
signal was broadcast at a correspondingly increased power
level. In a live broadcast attack, this increase in power
would not be necessary, but the interference signal power
would have to be adjusted according to the free space path
loss between the transmit antenna and the target receiver.
Denial of GPS L1 C/A PVT
In the first test, the ability of the systematic jammer to
deny observations and a PVT from GPS L1 C/A was ex-
amined. The experimental setup described above was used,
and the pulse pattern depicted in Fig. 3 (a) was used. The
prototype jammer was powered up and allowed to initialize
and align with GNSS time. Next the receiver under test
was issued a cold-start command its behaviour was ob-
served. The test was repeated with progressively increas-
ing interference power until a power level was established at
which the receiver was unable to produce a PVT, which was
observed to occur at an instantaneous interference to noise
floor level of approximately 30 dB, as depicted in Fig. 7 A
trace of the 11 GPS satellites being tracked by the receiver
are shown in Fig. 8, where it can be seen that the received
C/N0 for the L1 C/A signal ranges from 49 to 35 dBHz,
but experiences brief reductions in power of approximately
6 dB. During the entire test, the receiver was unable to
provide a sufficient set of observations and ephemerides
such that a PVT could be computed. Unfortunately it
was not possible to gain enough visibility into the internal
receiver functionality to determine exactly which informa-
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Figure 7: Screenshot of the spectrum analyzer attacked to
conductive test setup, depicted in Fig. 6, showing the in-
stantaneous power spectrum (yellow) and max-hold of the
spectrum (green) which is indicative of the instantaneous
interference-to-noise-floor ratio.
tion was successfuly extracted. It would have been helpful
to understand whether ephemeris, almanac, health status
and other variables were available, or whether the annihi-
lation of the TOW and subsequent CRC failure rendered
all data unavailable. Nonetheless, the results confirm that
it is possible to deny a GPS L1 C/A based PVT via the
targeted jamming of just a small portion of the navigation
message. Beyond the results presented here, a similar sys-
tematic interference test was conducted and configured to
run continuously over 24 hour period, such that the receiver
experienced a complete change in the visible constellation.
Again, it was found that the receiver was unable at any
point to provide a PVT.
Denial of Galileo E1B PVT
The second test conducted was designed to assess the abil-
ity of the systematic jammer to deny observations and a
PVT from the Galileo E1B signals. The pulse pattern
was further changed to that of Fig. 3 (b) and an exper-
imental setup similar to the GPS case was used, however,
due to the low availability of healthy Galileo satellites, the
live GNSS feed from the roof antenna was replaced with a
simulated signal sourced from a Spectracom GSG-6 Series
Multi-Constellation simulator. In this case the pulse pat-
tern significantly more distributed in time, being spread
relatively evenly across the I/NAV odd page. This partic-
ular pulse pattern was shaped according to the interleaving
pattern, rather than being aligned with a particular data
word, with the intention that once it is deinterleaved, it
will appear as a continuous stream of symbol errors arriv-
ing at the decoder. It is expected that this will have a
greater impact on the performance of the decoder, than
would a set of sparse errors. Interestingly, the ability of
Figure 8: Screenshot from the uBlox uCenter™during a
systematic interference attack on GPS L1 C/A.
this approach to deny the navigation message is relatively
insensitive to its alignment with the beginning of the page.
Provided the complete set of pulses are received within one
page, they will be de-interleaved into a continuous stream.
A screenshot from one of the tests is shown in Fig. 9 which
includes a trace from 8 Galileo and 9 GPS satellites. As
expected, the Galileo E1B message has been denied by the
systematic interference. Two interesting observations were
made during this test. Firstly, it was noted that the recep-
tion of the GPS L1 C/A signal was relatively unaffected.
8 of the 9 satellites report useful observations, and the re-
ceiver steadily provided a GPS-based PVT. It is suspected
that the single GPS satellite not providing observations is
in fact a false acquisition. The second particularly strik-
ing observation is that the C/N0 reported by the receiver
under test does not exhibit any significant variation either
for GPS or for the Galileo satellites. A consistently high
C/N0, in the range of 48 to 49 dBHz, was reported for
all Galileo satellites, despite the fact that the receiver was
unable to extract navigation data from any of them.
A few interesting conclusions are drawn from these re-
sults. We note that is is possible to deny the use of one kind
of GNSS signal, in this case, Galileo E1B, while leaving the
other, in this case GPS L1 C/A, relatively unaffected, even
when the occupy the same RF band. This appears to be
due to the relative orthogonality of the navigation message
structures, owing to their significantly different symbol pe-
riods, 4 ms and 20 ms, and the fact that one employs FEC
while the other does not. It is also clear that the obser-
vation of C/N0 may not be a useful means of interference
detection, given that the C/N0 level observed on the GPS
and Galileo signals was virtually identical, yet the impact
of the interference on the receivers ability to process the
signal is drastically different.
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Figure 9: Screenshot from the uBlox uCenter™during a
systematic interference attack on Galileo E1B.
Power, energy and synchronisation
The probability of a bit or symbol error occurring is a very
nonlinear function of the instantaneous interference power
(considering both the complimentary error function, and
the nonlinearity of a receiver’s front-end), and, as has been
shown in the previous experiment, a certain instantaneous
power must be applied before any errors are observed in a
single test. Increasing the interference power beyond this
point will not increase the probability that a bit error has
been induced beyond 0.5. To achieve a more reliable denial
of the navigation message, more symbols must be targeted,
where the probability that the message is corrupted is given
by:
PErr = 1− 0.5NPulse . (1)
where NPulse denotes the number of corrupted symbols.
This probability tends to unity quite rapidly. Naturally,
the total interference energy required increases as a linear
function of the number of symbols:
EInt = PIntNPulseTPulse, (2)
where TPulse is the pulse periods, being equal to the sym-
bol or bit period. An astute adversary will tune this energy
effecting a tradeoff between the likelihood that the naviga-
tion message is denied, and the likelihood that the inter-
ference power will alert the receiver to the attack, enabling
some type of mitigation. Of course, other factors must
be considered, including the temporal smoothing that the
receiver might apply to signal and noise power estimates,
where long averaging of C/N0 will tend to hide short and
sporadic bursts of interference, as shown in the case of
Galileo E1B.
Signal TPulse NPulse TPatt KSyst
GPS L1 C/A 20 ms 6 6 s 17 dB
Galileo E1B 4 ms 15 2 s 15 dB
Table 2: Effective reduction in required average interfer-
ence power when employing systematic jamming.
In terms of the total interference energy, or the average
interference power required to render the PVT unavailable,
one can consider the effective gain achieved by applying a
systematic interference signal, relative to a continuous in-
terference signal. Essentially expressing the average duty-
cycle of the interference, it can be computed as the ratio
of on time to off time:
KSyst = −10log10
(
NPulseTPulse
TPatt
)
, (3)
where TPatt is the repetition period of the interference pat-
tern, being 6 seconds for GPS L1 C/A and 2 seconds for
Galileo E1 B. The interference configuration for both the
GPS L1 C/A and Galileo E1B are summarised in Tab. 2,
where it is suggested that the effective gain of applying
systematic jamming, as opposed to continuously broadcast
jamming, is in the region of 15 to 17 dB. Moreover, al-
though the results here have been generated using a tightly
synchronised transmitter (with an error in the region of
some tens of nanoseconds), the principle of operation of
the systematic jammer would permit synchronisation er-
rors in the region of 1 to 10 ms. Notably, at this level of
timing error, the jammer may no longer need to avail of
position information.
CONCLUSION
The literature to date has primarily considered the two ex-
tremes of GNSS vulnerability, being either a very simple
jamming attack, or a very complicated spoofing attack.
However, there appears to be a middle-ground, which is
very accessible to a malicious attacker, as it only requires
commercial, off-the-shelf components, and some basic in-
tegration; yet it can pose a significant threat to a naïve
receiver implementation. This increased threat comes at a
very small increased attack cost and complexity, and has
the potential to disrupt many location-based services, by
imposing an undetectable partial (data recovery) or full
(position and timing) denial-of-service.
Preliminary results suggest that this attack methodology
is feasible and, under certain conditions may be quite effec-
tive when targeting a naïve receiver. The extent to which
this attack methodology can be used has been studied and
the various advantages and disadvantages of certain GNSS
signal structures have been identified. Further studies will
aim to quantify the increased risk posed by such an attack
and to identify receiver strategies which may offer improved
resilience.
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